Thesis Antithisis Synthesis
As he puts the argument, then, the scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. The form or presentation of logic, he says, has three sides or moments (EL §79).
Instead, the movement to new determinations is driven by the nature of the earlier determinations.Unlike in Plato’s arbitrary dialectics, then—which must wait around until some other idea comes in from the outside—in Hegel’s dialectics “nothing extraneous is introduced”, as he says (SL-M 54; cf. His dialectics is driven by the nature, immanence or “inwardness” of its own content (SL-M 54; cf. Third, because later determinations “sublate” earlier determinations, the earlier determinations are not completely cancelled or negated.On the contrary, the earlier determinations are in the sense that they remain in effect within the later determinations.The back-and-forth dialectic between Socrates and his interlocutors thus becomes Plato’s way of arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated views or positions and for the more sophisticated ones later. Hegel (see entry on Hegel), which, like other “dialectical” methods, relies on a contradictory process between opposing sides.“Hegel’s dialectics” refers to the particular dialectical method of argument employed by the 19th Century German philosopher, G. Whereas Plato’s “opposing sides” were people (Socrates and his interlocutors), however, what the “opposing sides” are in Hegel’s work depends on the subject matter he discusses.In the course of the dialogues, Socrates’ interlocutors propose definitions of philosophical concepts or express views that Socrates challenges or opposes.The back-and-forth debate between opposing sides produces a kind of linear progression or evolution in philosophical views or positions: as the dialogues go along, Socrates’ interlocutors change or refine their views in response to Socrates’ challenges and come to adopt more sophisticated views.He argued that Plato’s dialectics deals only with limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness (SL-M 55–6; SL-d G 34–5; PR, Remark to §31).According to the logic of a traditional argument, if the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are false—which leaves us with no premises or with nothing.In this moment, a one-sidedness or restrictedness (EL Remark to §81) in the determination from the moment of understanding comes to the fore, and the determination that was fixed in the first moment passes into its opposite (EL §81).Hegel describes this process as a process of “self-sublation” (EL §81).